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 Love and sex provide a fertile ground for philosophical inquiry, both conceptual analysis
of the nature of love and sex and discussion of the many ethical issues that they raise. Moral
issues arising from love include the permissibility of romantically loving more than one person at
the same time (assuming that this is even possible) and the moral value of romantic love and
friendship. Moral issues arising from sex vary from the most fundamental question—the one
addressed by Alan Soble in his paper in this issue—of whether sex can be reconciled with
respect for persons, to questions about the permissibility of sex in particular circumstances.
Much current work in philosophy of love and sex concerns precisely such issues in applied
ethics, for instance the topics addressed by the authors of four more papers in this collection
—homosexuality, prostitution, relationships that cross power lines in academia, and the
wrongness of rape and other sexual misdeeds. Other ethical issues about sex include the morality
of casual sex, adultery and open marriage, sadomasochism, and pornography.
 While philosophers since at least the time of Plato have discussed love and sex, it remains a
relatively unexplored region of our discipline, in sharp contrast to such areas of applied ethics as
medical and business ethics. Specialized journals are devoted to each of these and other
branches of applied ethics and many philosophy departments enroll far more undergraduate
students in such applied ethics courses than in any others. The visibility of the philosophy of
love and sex is confined in the United States to a few anthologies and books that have appeared
over the last two decades or so, a relatively small number of journal articles, meetings of the
Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love at American Philosophical Association meetings,
and courses offered by a small percentage of departments.
 The low profile of the philosophy of love and sex is surprising given the central role that
love and sex play in most people’s lives. The comparative rarity of courses in the area is
doubtless explicable by market forces: philosophy departments are more likely to offer applied
ethics courses that cater to vast numbers of students in pre-professional programs such as
business and medicine. The relatively small number of journal articles on philosophy of love and
sex may be due to editors’ and referees’ perception that the field has only marginal credibility as
a legitimate branch of philosophy. It may also have a more mundane explanation: there might
just be very few articles submitted on this area, or very few of sufficient quality. These two
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explanations may be related: the perception that a field is considered marginal may deter
philosophers from working in it. The fact that this young e-journal has attracted papers of such a
high standard—certainly comparable to the level of papers in other areas of applied ethics that
have been published in print journals—may reflect the difficulty of placing papers on the
philosophy of love and sex in print journals.
 However, our being able to publish six excellent papers is cause for celebration, not
lamentation, by readers of this journal. Each one provides a significant advance on the existing
literature and does so in a provocative, engaging manner. And I hope that this issue will, in a
modest way, help to promote the cause of philosophy of love and sex. These six exemplars of
philosophical analysis may attract new philosophers to the field, and their own writings may in
turn increase its quality and visibility.
  The six essays in this issue provide a good cross-section of current work in philosophy of
love and sex. Reflecting the current trend, five of them deal with sexual ethics. A common theme
in the first four papers is a challenge to widely held liberal views about sex or, in the case of
Richter’s paper, about a “zone of privacy” into which the government may not intrude. One
important sub-area of the field that is not represented in this collection is analysis of the concept
of romantic love. However, the sixth essay examines the nature of a different kind of love: love
between friends. Following are brief introductory comments on each of the essays.
  Alan Soble has arguably done more than anyone else to advance the field of philosophy of
love and sex. His books, articles, and edited anthologies are required reading for serious students
of the field. His paper in this collection, “Sexual Use and What to Do About It: Internalist and
Externalist Sexual Ethics,” is nothing less than a definitive discussion of the most fundamental
question in sexual ethics: can we reconcile sex, in which we use another person’s body for our
own pleasure, with Kant’s injunction to treat other people as ends in themselves and never only
as means? Soble provides an invaluable typology of different solutions to what he calls “the sex
problem,” illustrating each approach by reference to the work of a contemporary philosopher.
Perhaps the most surprising and intriguing of his conclusions is that well-known defenses of a
liberal view on sex are untenable. He criticizes Alan Goldman’s and Thomas Mappes’ views that
my using my partner sexually is fine as long as our sexual encounter involves, respectively,
reciprocity and informed consent. Soble contends that arguments that sexual use is inherently
wrong are not even addressed by the fact that the sexual use is mutual and fully voluntary. But
this is not to say that Soble defends a conservative sexual ethic. On the contrary, in an extended
discussion of the position that Martha Nussbaum defends in her article, “Objectification,” Soble
criticizes her view precisely because it entails that casual sex is automatically wrong. After these
insightful objections to initially plausible solutions to “the sex problem,” the reader thirsts for
Soble’s own positive account, but that is a task for another paper or book.
 Yolanda Estes’ “Moral Reflections on Prostitution” directly takes on the liberal view that
prostitution is not inherently wrong, as long as it involves a fully voluntary transaction between
two autonomous adults. Proponents of this view do not deny that this condition is often not met
in the real world, in which many prostitutes are underage, ruthlessly exploited by pimps, or
driven by powerful drug addictions. Their point remains that it is not in principle objectionable
for a prostitute to sell her sexual services. The innovation of Estes’ response to the liberal view is
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her detailed account of the phenomenology of prostitution: the motives of the client and the
prostitute, and the likely emotional consequences of their sexual encounters. In particular, she
points out the contradictory desires of the client, who wants both a sex object who will satisfy
his physical needs and a person in whom he can elicit genuine and spontaneous physical and
even emotional responses. The prostitute is caught in a dilemma of her own: to keep her client
happy, she has to pretend that she enjoys their sexual acts, but to preserve her own dignity, she
tries to detach her emotions from what she is doing. The more successful she is at this
detachment, the more difficulty she may experience in reintegrating her emotional responses
when she engages in sex with genuine romantic partners. The upshot is that the client is likely to
remain emotionally unsatisfied and the prostitute is likely to experience emotional difficulties in
her own private sex life. Since this emotional harm to both prostitute and client is very likely to
arise, to engage in this activity is problematic for both parties from both a Kantian and a
utilitarian perspective.
 Another widely held liberal view is that the government has no right to interfere with
harmless self-regarding actions on the ground of their alleged immorality, as long as they are
performed in private. Hart, in his celebrated debate with Devlin, is the best-known proponent of
this view, which Feinberg has more recently defended in Harmless Immoralities. Duncan J.
Richter, in his essay “Social Integrity and ‘Private Immorality’: The Hart-Devlin Debate
Reconsidered,” challenges this liberal orthodoxy and defends a more charitable, communitarian
version of Devlin’s legal moralism than the one that Hart criticizes. Richter agrees with Hart that
society will not be destroyed if it tolerates behavior that the majority considers immoral. He
argues, however, that people in a society that is not united by certain core values will be unable
to flourish. And cannibalism, necrophilia, bestiality, or other practices that are almost
universally abhorred would constitute such a threat to these shared values that they should not
be protected from governmental interference by a “zone of privacy.” However, having granted
Devlin his crucial premise that legal moralism is sometimes justified, Richter proceeds to argue
that homosexuality is not the kind of alleged immorality that warrants legal restrictions. Gay
people who are legally punished for expressing their sexuality are prevented from flourishing in a
more serious way than are people who are offended by gays in a society that tolerates
homosexuality. So even a charitable reading of Devlin’s view does not support his argument for
prosecuting homosexual behavior.
 While condemnation of sexual harassment and quid pro quo offers by faculty members to
students is almost universal, a liberal attitude toward relationships would see nothing
objectionable in a voluntary sexual relationship between a professor and a college student.
Deirdre Golash’s paper, “Power, Sex and Friendship in Academia,” challenges this liberal view.
However, her reasons for doing so are themselves quite acceptable to liberals. Her main concern
is that the student, no matter how much the professor assures her that her decision on whether or
not to enter a sexual relationship with the professor will have no impact on her grade in the
class, will be unable to make a fully voluntary decision to accept the professor’s advances.
Because of the huge power differential, frank communication will be difficult and the student
will always fear that refusing the offer will jeopardize her academic future. And the same
difficulties in communication will prevent the professor from being certain that his offer has been
accepted out of genuine desire, rather than out of fear of retaliation should she decline. Golash
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also opposes sexual relationships between professors and students on the further ground that
they present professors with a conflict of interest that compromises the integrity of their grades
and other evaluations of the students with whom they are involved. However, she disagrees with
Peter Markie’s argument that the same considerations also rule out faculty-student friendships,
since Golash argues that sexual relationships are considerably more fraught with danger than
friendships. An interesting question is how Golash’s position would apply to an intermediate
case: romantic but non-sexual relationships between professors and students.
 The wrongness of rape seems self-evident, but philosophers have differed as to how we
should understand the nature of rape. The starting point of Mark Cowling’s paper, “Rape, and
Other Sexual Assaults: Towards a Philosophical Analysis,” is the wide discrepancy between the
relatively small number of rapes that are reported each year and, on the other hand, survey
results indicating that nearly one half of all woman suffer from a sexual assault. He proposes a
definition of rape that makes sense of this discrepancy and then proceeds to analyze the precise
nature of the moral wrong that rapists commit. Using the minimal definition of rape as “sex
without the consent of the victim,” Cowling suggests that one reason for the inflated rape
statistics reported in surveys may be the conflation of rape with “altruistic sex,” that is, sex
performed, not out of sexual desire, but in order to please a partner. Such “unwanted but
consenting sex” may be quite common, but it does not meet the definition of rape as
nonconsensual sex. Cowling argues that the best way to analyze the harm caused by rape is as a
violation of sexual self-determination that causes great distress to the victim. Rather than trying
to fit all sexual experiences into the binary rape/not rape categories, he suggests that we should
regard rape as one among many sexual offenses, all of which impose varying degrees of harm on
the victim. On this view, sexual harassment, threats to spread harmful rumors, coercive offers,
emotional pressure, and the use or threat of physical force are all immoral means to obtain sex
without a person's fully voluntary consent. Rape is typically the most serious violation of sexual
autonomy and deserves the heaviest penalty, but we also need to recognize and punish lesser
violations according to the degree of distress that they cause.
 The final paper in this collection, Andrew Mitchell’s “Friendship Amongst the
Self-Sufficient: Epicurus,” shows that high quality historical scholarship has an important place
in philosophy of love and sex. Whereas the five other essays in this volume address ethical
issues, Mitchell’s primary concern is with the nature of friendship. However, his analysis also
sheds light on the moral value of friendship. He contrasts Epicurus’ account of friendship with
those of Aristotle and the Stoics, both of which (in different ways) make the mistake of basing
friendship on utility and sameness between the friends. Requiring sameness before friendship can
occur denies us of one of the greatest benefits of friendship, namely expanding our “horizons of
understanding” and being introduced to “differences of culture, class, or race.” And tying
friendship to utility diminishes the fulfillment that we gain from it, since “[a]n inverse relation
would seem to pertain between pleasure and utility.” Mitchell presents instead a very appealing
reading of Epicurus’ account of friendship. Given the centrality of self-sufficiency to Epicurus’
ethics, the best type of friendship is entered freely, not out of necessity. However, the act of
befriending someone threatens that very self-sufficiency, since I may come to need that friend,
she too may come to need me and, worse yet, she may exploit me for her own purposes.
Friendship thus requires mutual trust, since it involves risking the self-sufficiency on which
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Epicurus places such importance. (While this is not a thesis that Mitchell defends, this mutual
trust is arguably one reason why friendship has inherent moral value.) Happily, though, the
person who is willing to run this risk by entering friendships has attained the highest level of
self-sufficiency.
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